The global helium market experienced a major supply shock in 2026, yet several London-listed helium companies have struggled to sustain the share-price gains recorded earlier in the year. Helium One Global, Helix Exploration and Pulsar Helium are all trading above their levels of twelve months ago, but each has retreated from annual peaks. For investors, the question is why a tightening helium market has not been sufficient to sustain those higher valuations.
The answer appears to lie less in the helium market itself than in the economics of bringing the gas into production. All three companies have made technical or commercial progress, but their shareholders face different challenges. Helium One needs to demonstrate commercial gas deliverability, Helix has encountered a regulatory interruption to production, and Pulsar faces considerable capital requirements before its proposed processing facilities can generate revenue.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, helium discovery, a producing well and a profitable helium business are not the same thing.
A Supply Shock That Changed Expectations
Helium entered 2026 following a period of relatively comfortable global supply. Additional production from Russia contributed to weaker market conditions during 2025, when supply was estimated to exceed demand. For companies developing new helium projects, this created uncertainty over the long-term prices available to support investment in production and processing facilities.
That changed dramatically in March when Iranian strikes damaged Qatar's energy infrastructure at Ras Laffan, interrupting liquefied natural gas production and associated helium supply. QatarEnergy indicated that the damage would reduce the country's helium exports by approximately 14%, with some repairs potentially taking several years. Spot helium prices rose sharply as industrial buyers sought alternative supplies.
The disruption demonstrated the vulnerability of a concentrated international supply chain serving semiconductor manufacturing, medical imaging, aerospace and other industries. New sources of reliable helium production outside established supply centres could therefore have considerable commercial value, particularly where customers are seeking greater security of supply.
Helium is not traded like oil. There is no widely accepted benchmark equivalent to Brent, and much of the market operates through privately negotiated contracts with industrial gas companies. Spot prices, long-term contract prices and the realised prices available to individual producers can differ substantially. A shortage today benefits a development project only to the extent that it improves the revenues achievable when production eventually becomes available.
London's helium shares initially attracted considerable interest, but investors subsequently appeared to reassess individual companies as operational and financing developments emerged. Pulsar traded around 140p during March before falling to approximately 54p by 9 October. Helix reached around 47p in April but was trading at 26.5p in early October. Helium One declined from 0.63p on 10 April to 0.45p on 9 October, despite a recovery during the final trading sessions.
These are not identical comparisons since the respective peaks occurred at different times.
Helium Concentration Is Not the Same as Production
One of the most revealing comparisons is between Helium One's Southern Rukwa project in Tanzania and Helix Exploration's Rudyard project in Montana. Both companies have reported encouraging helium concentrations, but the volumes of helium indicated by their well tests are dramatically different.
Helium One's Itumbula West-1 well, known as ITW-1, produced sustained helium concentrations of 5.4%, with a maximum recorded concentration of 9.2%, during electric submersible pump testing in early 2026. These are impressive concentrations compared with many conventional helium-bearing natural gas accumulations. The company also demonstrated considerable fluid deliverability, averaging approximately 15,000 barrels of water per day during the test.
The difficulty is that relatively little gas was recovered alongside that water. Helium One reported an average gas-to-water ratio of 0.05 standard cubic metres of gas per cubic metre of produced water. Combining the reported fluid rate, gas-to-water ratio and helium concentration gives an indicative helium flow of approximately 230 standard cubic feet per day, before processing losses.
Helix's Darwin #1 well provides a very different example. In December 2024, the company reported a gas flow rate of 2,750 thousand cubic feet per day, containing approximately 1.1% helium. That equates to around 30,250 cubic feet of helium per day, before processing losses.
On those reported test figures, Darwin #1 delivered approximately 130 times as much helium as ITW-1, despite having a helium concentration roughly one-fifth as high.
The comparison requires qualification. These were tests in different geological systems under different operating conditions. Neither result establishes sustainable production rates, recoverable reserves or project profitability. Nevertheless, the figures demonstrate why helium concentration alone is an inadequate measure of commercial potential. What matters economically is the volume of saleable helium that can be recovered over time and the cost of producing it.
Helium One's results were not without encouragement. Its reported helium concentration and gas-to-water ratio exceeded the assumptions used in the P90 case of its June 2025 Competent Persons Report, which assumed 3.3% helium and a gas-to-water ratio of 0.04. The company also demonstrated encouraging pressure recovery following shut-in and increased fluid production compared with its earlier natural-flow testing.
There is, however, a geological complication. Helium One has suggested that water from the shallower Karoo aquifer may have diluted helium-bearing fluids originating from the deeper fractured basement. Temperature and salinity measurements support that interpretation, while incomplete isolation of the two systems during testing creates uncertainty over the productive characteristics of the basement reservoir itself.
From a reservoir engineering perspective, this is where I would concentrate the analysis. The discovery of helium is established, but the economics depend on whether the reservoir can deliver commercially attractive volumes without the need to lift and handle disproportionate quantities of water. Further testing that isolates the basement reservoir more effectively could materially change the assessment.
Helium One holds a 480 square kilometre mining licence awarded in July 2025 and is seeking an industry partner to advance Southern Rukwa. Its 50% interest in the Galactica-Pegasus development in Colorado also provides exposure to an operation that has commenced helium sales. The US investment is relevant to the company's value, but its financial contribution must be assessed through the cash flow attributable to Helium One.
The Tanzanian asset could ultimately become commercially valuable. For shareholders, however, the next meaningful increase in value is likely to depend on demonstrating economically sustainable helium production and securing development capital on acceptable terms.
Helix Has Found Customers but Production Has Been Interrupted
Helix Exploration has progressed further towards commercialisation. Its Rudyard development began producing helium in February 2026, with commercial trailer sales commencing in July under an agreement with an industrial gases customer. By early September, the company had reported three completed trailer sales, demonstrating that its helium could be processed and marketed.
However, the transition into production exposed a regulatory problem. On 12 August, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation formally ordered Helix's operating subsidiary, Hereford Resources, to cease production from the Darwin #1 and Weil #1 wells until the operations complied with applicable regulations or the Board granted authorisation.
The order followed a field inspection on 28 July during which regulatory staff identified gas being vented in connection with production and deficiencies relating to required samples and gas analysis. The Board rejected a request to continue operating for another month, determining that production could not lawfully continue under the existing arrangements.
The issue concerns the handling of gas produced alongside helium. Darwin #1's gas contains approximately 95% nitrogen and 1.1% helium, meaning that considerable volumes of predominantly nitrogen-rich gas must be managed during helium recovery. The fact that most of the gas is non-combustible nitrogen does not remove the relevant regulatory obligations.
Helix's 3 September announcement described the situation as a requested regulatory pause. The original order establishes that production had been formally prohibited on 12 August, approximately three weeks before the market announcement. The company reported two trailer movements by 6 August and three sales by 3 September, but the individual dates of those sales have not all been established. Without a complete chronology, it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions about production after the order or the company's disclosure obligations.
A regulatory hearing is scheduled for 15 October. Its outcome will help establish whether production can resume promptly and whether further operating expenditure or infrastructure changes are required.
The commercial position is more encouraging. In September, Helix announced that its customer had extended the purchasing arrangement through March 2027, subject to production resuming. The customer agreed to purchase all available helium volumes, with management indicating that prices were above the assumptions in its original pre-IPO financial modelling. The immediate problem therefore appears to concern operational and regulatory execution rather than customer demand.
Helix has also expanded through the acquisition of the Keyes Helium Complex in Oklahoma for $11 million. The facility includes existing purification and liquefaction infrastructure, potentially allowing Helix to participate more extensively in the helium value chain and generate revenue from third-party processing.
The acquisition economics deserve attention. Keyes generated approximately $2.91 million of revenue and $1.42 million of EBITDA during the five months to 31 May 2026. Annualising that EBITDA produces approximately $3.4 million, implying an acquisition multiple of around 3.2 times annualised EBITDA. On the face of it, that is an inexpensive price for an operating specialist facility.
The qualification concerns the sustainability of those earnings. Keyes has historically processed crude helium drawn from the former US Bureau of Land Management reserve, alongside helium supplied through other arrangements. The security, duration and commercial terms of future feedstock supply are fundamental to valuation. An acquisition multiple of three times sustainable EBITDA is very different from the same multiple applied to earnings that may decline as a finite source of helium is depleted.
Helix raised £17.6 million at 22p per share in July, issuing 80 million new shares to finance its expansion. That increased its share count materially, but the transaction should not simply be regarded as dilution. If Keyes continues generating attractive returns and improves the economics of Helix's own production, the capital raised could be justified.
Pulsar and the Cost of Commercialisation
Pulsar Helium faces a different challenge at its Topaz project in Minnesota. The company has demonstrated a helium-rich resource and is advancing plans for a purification and liquefaction development. Its proposed Rare Gas Hub would also recover carbon dioxide, providing an additional potential revenue stream.
On 1 October, Pulsar announced that it had accepted a firm equipment-supply proposal from Chart, now part of Baker Hughes. The equipment package includes a helium purification and liquefaction plant with nameplate capacity of approximately 7.5 million litres of liquid helium annually, equivalent to around 200 million cubic feet of gaseous helium. A separate carbon dioxide processing facility would have capacity to capture 300 tonnes per day.
This represents a major industrial development rather than a modest wellhead recovery installation. Its commercial success will depend on sufficient feedgas volumes, processing efficiency, utilisation, operating costs and the ability to sell the products at attractive realised prices. Nameplate capacity does not establish that the proposed volumes can be produced or marketed.
The equipment package has an aggregate value of $85.5 million, with an initial payment of $5.025 million and a further $8.55 million scheduled for January 2027, subject to funding. Pulsar disclosed cash resources of approximately $25.2 million at the time of the announcement, leaving a difference of around $60 million between available cash and the equipment cost alone.
That is not a definitive funding gap. Payments are staged, expenditure has already been incurred on certain items, and additional financing may be secured. However, the $85.5 million excludes the full installed development cost, including installation, commissioning, site infrastructure, interconnections, taxes and other expenditure. The total capital required will therefore be greater than the equipment commitment.
Existing financing obligations must also be considered. Pulsar previously secured a $4 million project-finance facility from University Bancorp at 12% annual interest, with maturity subsequently extended to November 2026. The bank also expressed non-binding interest in providing up to $12.5 million of additional financing, although that did not constitute committed development capital. The current outstanding debt balance and repayment arrangements need to be reconciled with the latest development commitments.
Pulsar raised approximately £19 million in July at 75p per share, issuing around 25.4 million new shares. By 9 October, the shares were trading around 54p, below the price at which investors provided new capital three months earlier.
Timing introduces further uncertainty. The October announcement indicates that equipment manufacture is scheduled to extend approximately two years following the second milestone payment, although some liquefaction equipment has already been manufactured. The development must still progress through engineering, construction and commissioning before sustained commercial revenues can be achieved.
The relevant investment question is whether Topaz can generate returns sufficient to justify the complete development cost, including financing. Strong helium prices improve the revenue outlook, but a project with a long construction period should not depend on exceptional spot prices persisting indefinitely. Nor should the size of the resource automatically determine the scale of the processing investment.
Pulsar may ultimately develop a strategically valuable new source of helium. The challenge for existing shareholders is how the remaining expenditure will be financed and how much of the resulting economic value they will retain.
The Company Moving in the Opposite Direction
Georgina Energy complicates any suggestion that investors have simply abandoned helium. Its shares rose from approximately 4.25p in April to 12.75p by 9 October, an increase of around 200%.
Georgina has exposure to helium, hydrogen and hydrocarbons through its Australian portfolio, including the Hussar and Mt Winter projects. During 2026, the company reported progress with drilling preparations, infrastructure and related development arrangements, providing potential catalysts for investor interest.
Georgina's performance cannot simply be attributed to non-dilutive financing. Its framework agreement with Harlequin contemplated project funding and offtake, but the relevant commitments depend on further commercial agreements. The company has also undertaken equity financing and warrant transactions. A separate acquisition proposal that contemplated significant potential dilution was terminated in May, so the shares associated with that proposed transaction should not be treated as having been issued.
The wider financing distinction matters. Non-dilutive funding is not necessarily cheaper than an equity placing. If a company retains its share count but commits future production to a financier or customer on unattractive terms, it can transfer considerable economic value without issuing a single additional share. What matters is the total cost of financing and the proportion of future project cash flow retained by shareholders.
Georgina is not a direct valuation comparison because its development stage and commodity exposure differ. Nevertheless, its performance demonstrates that company-specific expectations can dominate the investment case, even within a group of businesses exposed to the same commodity.
What Ultimately Belongs to Shareholders?
All three companies have raised equity during 2026, increasing their financial resources but also expanding their issued share capital. Assessing share-price performance without examining the amount of capital raised, the change in market capitalisation and the fully diluted share count risks confusing business progress with shareholder returns.
A company that raises £20 million has increased its financial resources by approximately £20 million before expenses, but it has not created that amount of economic value simply by issuing shares. Value is created when capital is invested in assets capable of generating returns above the cost of that capital, after allowing for risk and the time required to produce cash flow.
Clearly, dilution is not inherently destructive if the funds raised generate sufficiently attractive returns. This is particularly relevant in helium, where development models vary considerably. Some projects benefit from existing wells and processing infrastructure, while others require new purification and liquefaction facilities. Where helium is recovered alongside natural gas or carbon dioxide, project economics also depend on the revenue and cost contributions of those products.
The appropriate measure is the risk-adjusted value of future cash flows after operating costs, capital expenditure, financing obligations and contractual commitments. For equity investors, that value must ultimately be measured per share, using a realistic assessment of the capital structure likely to exist when commercial production is established.
Helium Is Not Necessarily the Problem
The evidence does not support the conclusion that London's helium shares have weakened because the global helium market has become structurally unattractive. Qatar's supply disruption has reinforced the strategic importance of alternative helium sources, while industrial demand continues to support the market. The more immediate challenges facing these companies concern reservoir deliverability, regulatory compliance, infrastructure economics and development financing.
Helix has already demonstrated commercial sales, while its acquisition of Keyes may provide attractive returns if existing earnings and feedstock supplies prove sustainable. Helium One and Pulsar have potentially valuable resources, but more of their prospective value depends on further technical work, development expenditure and the terms on which future capital is obtained.
What concerns me most is the tendency to value junior resource companies on the attractiveness of what they have discovered without giving sufficient weight to the investment required to realise that value. A high helium concentration, a large resource estimate or an ambitious processing development can create a compelling investment story. None establishes the financial return an existing shareholder will ultimately receive.
The helium shortage may make these resources more valuable, but it does not make them cheaper to develop, remove operational constraints or eliminate the cost of capital. The investment opportunity lies in identifying which companies can convert favourable commodity fundamentals into sustainable cash flow while retaining enough of that value for shareholders.